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533 
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, WISE LEGAL GIANT 
 
Thomas A. Schweitzer* 
APPOINTMENT TO THE SUPREME COURT 
On July 20, 1993, Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appeared 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee and its chairman, Senator 
Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, for hearings on her nomination by 
President William J. Clinton to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.1  This was the first Supreme Court nomination by a 
Democratic president since Lyndon Johnson appointed Thurgood 
Marshall in 1967.  It was to replace retiring Justice Byron White, and 
Clinton told aides he wanted to hit a “home run.”2  Ginsburg’s 
nomination came at an awkward moment for President Clinton, who 
had made three unsuccessful nominations of women to Justice 
Department posts during his first year in office.3 
 
 
* Professor Emeritus, Touro Law School, 1984-2020; A.B. History Honors cum 
laude College of the Holy Cross, 1966; M.A., Ph.D. History, University of 
Wisconsin, 1971; J.D. Yale Law School, 1977.  
1 JANE SHERRON DE HART, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: A LIFE 319 (Vintage Books 
ed. 2020) (2018).  This remarkably comprehensive, legally sophisticated and 
readable work will no doubt rank as the definitive biography of the justice for the 
foreseeable future.  The author, a professor emerita of history at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, devoted over fifteen years to researching and writing it 
and was granted numerous interviews by Ginsburg and many of her friends and 
family members.  
2 Id. at 302. 
3 The abortive nominations were of Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney-General and 
Kimba Wood and Zoe Baird as Attorneys-General.  Jill Lepore, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s Unlikely Path to the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/08/ruth-bader-ginsburgs-unlikely-
path-to-the-supreme-court.  Clinton finally succeeded with his nomination of 
Attorney General Janet Reno, who urged him to appoint a woman to the Supreme 
Court.  DE HART, supra note 1, at 316. 
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Justice White was known to be thinking of retirement at the 
time of Clinton’s election, but this Kennedy nominee presumably 
wanted his successor to be appointed by a Democratic president.4  
After Clinton’s election, White tendered his resignation on March 19, 
1993.5  Clinton considered appointing a woman as White’s successor 
but initially demurred when Ginsburg was proposed to him because 
he had been told “The women are against her.”6  The women’s 
groups’ lack of enthusiasm for her was due in part to the critique of 
Roe v. Wade7 that she had articulated in her 1993 Madison Lecture.8  
On the fractious D.C. Circuit Court, Ginsburg had taken a 
middle-of-the-road stance.9  In November 1991, The American 
Lawyer named her one of the nation’s leading centrist judges.  As her 
friend Professor Jeffrey Rosen subsequently described her, she was 
considered “a paragon of judicial restraint.”10  When her candidacy 
was suggested, White House staffer Joel Klein distilled exhaustive 
research on Ginsburg into a nine-page single-spaced personal and 
legal profile.  The Klein memo concluded that Ginsburg was “an 
accomplished advocate, respected scholar and eminent jurist, highly 
esteemed for her forceful mind and dedication to the law.”11  He 
added that her court challenges in the 1970s “left a lasting imprint on 
legal doctrine and American society.  It may be a reflection of how 
far we have come that these triumphs seem taken for granted 
today.”12  Klein’s memo said she was not a judicial activist and said 
 
4 DE HART, supra note 1, at 309. 
5 Id. at 303. 
6 Lepore, supra note 3.  
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 DE HART, supra note 1, at 305-06; see infra p. 552 on the Madison Lecture. 
9 Ginsburg “position[ed] herself to the right of Wald, Mikva, and Edwards.”  DE 
HART, supra note 1, at 297.  Her friendship with Antonin Scalia, despite their 
diametrically opposed legal views, was legendary.  Perhaps even more surprising to 
her liberal clerks was that she became very friendly with Judge Robert Bork; the 
campaign led by Senator Ted Kennedy to derail Reagan’s nomination of Bork 
because of his extremist views was the first major partisan battle in the Senate on 
Supreme Court nominations.  Moreover, liberals were disappointed when she voted 
with Bork, Scalia, and other conservatives against navy petty officer James 
Dronenburg’s challenge to his dismissal by the Navy without back pay because his 
consensual homosexual conduct was deemed not to be protected by the right to 
privacy.  Id. at 297.  
10 DE HART, supra note 1, at 307 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The 
New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N. Y. TIMES, October 5, 1997, at SM 60).  
11 Id. at 305. 
12 Id. at 305-06. 
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that her approach to cases  was “fundamentally pragmatic, displaying 
little enthusiasm for rigid, abstract rules as theories.”13  DeHart 
explains that this approach means “someone who tended to resolve 
cases on narrow procedural grounds, preferring small incremental 
steps to bold assertions of judicial power in order to preserve the 
legitimacy of the outcome.”14  DeHart adds:  
Judicial minimalism, Clinton knew, was then 
considered to be the best defensive strategy at the time 
for putting a brake on the conservative activists on the 
Court who were vigorously striking down progressive 
legislation.  Further, minimalism encouraged justices 
to focus on the particularities of the case at hand rather 
than make sweeping announcements that get too far 
ahead of elected branches of government and the 
public in making law.15 
Ginsburg was sixty years old, not the ideal nominee’s age for 
partisan liberals who wanted to nominate a justice who would be 
expected to stay on the Court for three or more decades.  
Conservative Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, who was friendly with 
a law partner of Martin Ginsburg (Ruth’s husband), stated that 
Ginsburg would be an acceptable nominee.  However, Clinton, who 
had been elected with only 43% of the vote, appreciated the 
importance of appealing to Republicans.  White House staffer Joel 
Klein said Ginsburg would be a consensus builder and “would be 
perceived in many quarters as a departure from the use of ideology as 
a primary consideration in Supreme Court nominees.”16  Her 
candidacy was given a strong endorsement by her former Harvard 
professor and former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, who eight 
years earlier, in a speech to the NAACP, had identified her, Charles 
Houston, and Thurgood Marshall as three major advocates who had 
contributed to changing civil rights law.17  Columbia University 
President Michael Sovern also strongly endorsed her candidacy; his 
note to Senator Moynihan said “Pat, she‘s the real thing.”18 
 
 
13 Id. at 305. 
14 Id. at 307. 
15 Id. at 307-08. 
16 Id. at 306. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
3
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Duly impressed by these enthusiastic accolades by prominent 
jurists and his own staffer, Yale Law School graduate Bill Clinton 
summoned Ginsburg to meet with him on June 12.  While she lacked 
time to prepare and was chagrined to appear in casual clothing after 
this sudden request, Ginsburg made a superb impression on Clinton 
when he interviewed her.  Clinton declared that he was 
“tremendously impressed” by her life story and legal expertise, as 
someone who viewed government in terms of the way it impacted 
people’s lives.19  According to her biographer, Clinton concluded that 
she was a principled individual with sterling credentials, a brilliant 
mind and empathy for ordinary folk.  He decided to nominate her on 
the spot, and most women’s groups rallied to her support.20 
Ginsburg’s husband, prominent tax lawyer Martin Ginsburg, 
had actively promoted her nomination, and New York Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan had enthusiastically lobbied for her among his 
Senate colleagues.21  She had received the highest possible rating 
from the American Bar Association, and there appeared to be no 
organized public opposition to her nomination.22   
At the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Committee 
Chairman Biden was effusively cordial to Ginsburg.  According to 
historian Jill Lepore, this was because he was “[k]een to do penance 
for the debacle of the Clarence Thomas hearings, just two years 
before – the year before the Year of the Woman – when an all-male 
committee, chaired by Biden, failed to credit what Anita Hill had to 
say about George H. W. Bush’s Supreme Court nominee.”23 
Ginsburg was well-prepared for the July 20th Hearing; she had 
studied the entire history of Supreme Court nominations and was 
determined not to reveal any views she might hold on legal issues 
that might come before the Court.  She emphasized at the outset that 
 
19 Id. at 307. 
20 Id.  
21 White House staffers Ron Klain and Joel Klein lobbied for her on the “Hill,” and 
Judiciary Committee Counsel Elena Kagan carefully monitored the proceedings.  
Id. at 318, 321. 
22 Id. at 290.  Many prominent law professors and attorneys wrote letters in support 
of Ginsburg’s nomination, including Janet Benshoof, the founding director of the 
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, who was a Mac Arthur fellow and one of 
The National Law Journal’s “100 Most Influential Lawyers in America.”  Id. at 
315. 
23 Lepore, supra note 3. 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/5
2021 WISE LEGAL GIANT 537 
she was there “to be judged as a judge, not as an advocate.”24  Biden 
asked her how she could reconcile two positions she had taken on 
women’s rights issues.  On the one hand, in her path-breaking 
litigation in the 1970s, she had pressed the Supreme Court to make 
gender a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.  In contrast, at the 
New York University Madison Lecture several months before the 
committee hearing, she had taken a more moderate stance.25  In her 
NYU address, she stated that judges should be “moderate and 
restrained” concerning rights not listed in the Constitution and should 
not get ahead of “the political process.”26 
Judge Ginsburg resisted responding to this question by Biden.  
When he pressed her, however, she gave a good rationale for her 
reticence: 
We cherish living in a democracy, and we also know 
that this Constitution did not create a tricameral 
system.  Judges must be mindful of what their place is 
in this system and must always remember that we live 
in a democracy that can be destroyed if judges take it 
upon themselves to rule as Platonic guardians.27  
 
When Biden pressed her further, Ginsburg clammed up and 
repeatedly refused to answer questions “that may well be before the 
 
24 DE HART, supra note 1, at 319-20.  She promised to follow the guidance of 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who counseled that “[O]ne of the most sacred 
duties of a judge is not to read [her]convictions into [the Constitution].”  Id. at 320.  
25 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185 
(1992).  This article is an adaptation for publication of the initial Madison Lecture 
on Constitutional Law which Judge Ginsburg delivered at N.Y.U. on March 9, 
1993.  The article’s preface referred to the Roe v. Wade decision as follows: “she 
contrasts the Supreme Court’s sweeping opinion in Roe v. Wade with the Court’s 
more restrained approach in contemporaneous cases involving explicitly gender-
based discrimination . . .”  Id. at 1185.  See also Ian Shapiro, Still Speaking in a 
Judicial Voice: Ruth Bader Ginsburg Two Decades Later, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
257, 258 (2013).   
26 Lepore, supra note 3. 
27 Id.  Here, she invoked the traditional principle that since the Supreme Court is 
neither a third house of Congress with power to legislate nor the body of powerful 
elders who Plato in The Republic contemplated would rule society, justices should 
limit themselves to adjudicating cases and should avoid trying to read their 
personal opinions into laws. 
5
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Court again . . .”28  Eventually, Senator William Cohen of Maine 
exclaimed in frustration: “there is some suspicion in some circles . . . 
that you are basically a political activist who’s been hiding in the 
restrictive robes of an appellate judge, and that those restrictions will 
be cast aside when you don a much larger garment.”29 
Despite these pressures, Ginsburg stuck to her guns.  She won 
the unanimous support of the Judiciary Committee.  Shortly 
afterward, with Senator Moynihan’s “diligent and vigorous 
sponsorship,”30 the Senate endorsed her candidacy by a vote of 
ninety-six to three. 
Ginsburg’s appointment would make history since she would 
be the second female justice, and she had an outstanding record of 
achievement in women’s rights law.  Moreover, her overwhelming 
vote in the Senate seems hard to believe by twenty-first century 
standards.  Nevertheless, Judge Ginsburg’s Supreme Court candidacy 
was not greeted with unanimous acclaim by all proponents of 
women’s rights when her nomination was first suggested.  This was 
largely due to her position on Roe v. Wade, which struck down 
prohibitions of abortion in forty-six states.  As noted above, despite 
her strong support for abortion rights, Ginsburg did not concur with 
the legal basis of that opinion, a stance which she never repudiated.  
Her legal record on this matter, and the philosophy which it 
embodies, is the subject of this note.31   
EARLY BIOGRAPHY 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a tiny bird-like creature barely 
five feet tall, was universally and justly regarded as a legal giant 
when she died on September 18, 2020.  She was the unusual justice 
who made her greatest impact as an attorney before becoming a 
federal judge.  She earned this reputation by her successful advocacy 
 
28 DE HART, supra note 1, at 321. 
29 Id.  Elena Kagan, who served as counsel to the Judiciary Committee, was 
impressed by Ginsburg’s “preternaturally controlled testimony”: when she chose to 
sidestep a question, she would say that the question might come before the Court 
again, and “it would be inappropriate for me to say anything more.”  Id.  
30 Id.  
31 The fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe 
v. Bolton will occur in January 2023, and it will be interesting to see if any law 
schools observe the anniversary with symposia. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973).   
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in support of women’s rights and in opposition to entrenched gender 
stereotypes in the law during the 1970s.  Since the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, not a single Supreme Court decision 
had held that the equal protection clause was violated by 
discrimination against women.  Her four landmark cases permanently 
changed this.32  As a result, it was often noted that her cases leading 
to the advancement of women’s legal rights resembled Thurgood 
Marshall’s litigation success in advancing the civil rights of African 
Americans (Thurgood Marshall was the first African American 
Justice).  Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold may have been 
the first person to acknowledge this when he dubbed her “the 
Thurgood Marshall of gender equality law.”33  
Justice Ginsburg’s life and career coincided with the great 
expansion of women’s presence and accomplishment in law, 
medicine, and other professions.  Female students comprise more 
than half of law school enrollments at present, an astonishing figure 
when it is contrasted with their near-total absence when the future 
justice began her career more than six decades ago.  For instance, 
Ginsburg was one of nine female students in a Harvard Law School 
entering class of five hundred fifty-two.34  Ginsburg’s mother Celia, a 
very intelligent, strong woman, had had to subordinate her own 
ambitions in life to the interests of her brother Sol.  Conforming to 
the expectations of her working-class parents, Celia had gone to work 
to support herself and to help enable Sol to attend Cornell 
University.35  
Ruth Bader, who was born in Brooklyn in 1933, faced and 
overcame major challenges in life.  Her sister Marilyn died of spinal 
 
32 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 
1972); Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); and Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
33 Lepore, supra note 3.   
34 DE HART, supra note 1, at 54.  Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold often embarrassed 
entering female students by asking why they should take a place that belonged to a 
male who would be expected to support a family.  Some professors held a “ladies’ 
day” once a semester, the only time female students were called upon. 
35 “At that time, Jewish families commonly sacrificed the futures of their daughters 
to ensure that a son might attend a prestigious school and enter a high-status 
profession as his birthright in the New World, benefitting other members of the 
family with his upward mobility.”  Id. at 8.  Celia also saved a large sum of money 
for Ruth’s education which she ultimately did not need because she received 
scholarships.  Ruth gave most of the money to help her father, a struggling 
businessman.  Id. at 28.  
7
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meningitis at age six when Ruth was two, and her parents’ deep grief 
overshadowed her childhood.36  Her mother died when she was 
seventeen, causing her to miss her high school graduation two days 
later.  Early in their marriage, her husband Martin contracted 
testicular cancer as a Harvard law student, and she had to care for 
him and their young daughter.  Ginsburg’s husband eventually died 
of cancer, and she herself contracted colon cancer and pancreatic 
cancer.37   
Ruth met “Marty,” her future husband, as a young freshman at 
Cornell College.  They fell in love and married after her graduation at 
the age of twenty-one; their daughter Jane was born in 1955, a year 
later.  Then Marty was drafted, and they moved to Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma for two years.  Marty later described this unusually placid 
period as a stroke of good fortune, where they could get to know one 
another far from school and career pressure.  By all accounts, he was 
a wonderful spouse, and his prosperous parents fully supported Ruth 
and encouraged her to pursue law school despite having an infant 
daughter.  
The young couple then returned to Harvard, where Marty 
began law school and she followed him a year later.  In 1957, another 
tragedy struck: Marty contracted a life-threatening case of cancer.  
Fortunately, after two draconian operations and daily radiation 
treatments, he survived and recovered.  During this time, Ruth went 
to class herself, collected notes from Marty’s classes, and typed his 
papers, while caring for three-year-old Jane after the babysitter left at 
4 p.m.  Her workload and responsibilities were so overwhelming that 
she often stayed up all night during this period.38   
Upon graduating, Marty got a good law job as an associate 
with Weil Gotshal & Manges in New York.  Because of Marty's 
precarious health, Ruth did not want to risk living apart, so she 
moved with him and Jane to New York and transferred to Columbia 
Law School.  She was designated a Kent Scholar and was offered a 
place on the Columbia Law Review, where she excelled.39  She 
 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Id. at 349, 373, 402, 416. 
38 Id. at 70-73. 
39 Ginsburg had the perhaps unique distinction of becoming a member of two law 
reviews at prestigious law schools, and it is remarkable that as a transfer student, 
she was honored as a Kent Scholar.  In 1978, in a historic first, her daughter Jane 
Ginsburg was also elected to the Harvard Law Review, making them the first 
mother-daughter team in Harvard history.  Id. at 278. 
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graduated first in her class and had lined up a summer clerkship at a 
premier law firm.  As her biographer accurately notes:  
A job offer should have been a foregone conclusion 
for a student tied for first place in the graduating class 
at Columbia Law School.  Serving on the law reviews 
of both Harvard and Columbia and clerking 
successfully at a premier New York law firm were just 
icing on the cake.  Such superb credentials typically 
guaranteed offers from top Wall Street firms or a 
coveted clerkship with a judge on a federal appeals 
court.40   
Ginsburg, however, was disappointed.  While she knew she had 
performed well in her summer clerkship, Paul Weiss did not make 
her an offer; it had hired an African American woman, Pauli Murray, 
as an associate and apparently thought that was sufficient to show its 
commitment to diversity.  She was interviewed by a dozen law firms 
but received only two second interviews and no offer.41 
The other coveted option was a federal court clerkship.  Her 
professors at Columbia recommended her enthusiastically, but as she 
ruefully noted, she had three strikes against her: she was a woman, a 
Jew, and a mother of a young child.42  Columbia Law Professor 
Gerald Gunther,43 who admired her ability, went from office to office 
of the Second Circuit judges in Foley Square lobbying to get her a 
 
40 Id. at 78.  The law firm was Paul Weiss. 
41 Id. at 78-79. 
42 Id. at 79. 
43 Gerald Gunther, who was only six years older than Ginsburg, was a remarkable 
man who became her lifelong counselor.  He was born in 1927 in a small German 
town where his family had lived for centuries.  The family fled Germany for New 
York in 1938 after the synagogue in their town was burned.  He graduated from 
Brooklyn College in 1949 with an A.B. in History, earned an M.A. in Public Law 
and Government from Columbia in 1950, and was awarded an L.L.B. Magna Cum 
Laude by Harvard Law School in 1963.  He served as a law clerk to Second Circuit 
Judge Learned Hand in 1953-54 and subsequently for Chief Justice Earl Warren of 
the Supreme Court.  Warren credited him with a major role in writing the opinion 
in Brown v. Board of Education.  After a year in private practice, he was hired by 
Columbia Law School where he was in charge of selecting the limited number of 
superior graduates who were recommended for court clerkships.  He later served on 
the Stanford Law School faculty for many years.  While he was only six years older 
than Ginsburg, she valued him as a counselor for the rest of his life.  Gunther’s 
constitutional law case book was the most widely used lawbook in the American 
law schools.  
9
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clerkship, but all the judges refused.44  Then he contacted every 
Southern District federal judge but again was unsuccessful.  Finally, 
he went after District Judge Edmund L. Palmieri, a Columbia 
alumnus, and threatened to never send him another Columbia law 
clerk if he refused to hire Ginsburg.  Palmieri agreed, and she quickly 
won him over with her brilliance and hard work.45   
After the end of her clerkship with Judge Palmieri, Ginsburg 
would have welcomed an opportunity for an appellate or Supreme 
Court clerkship, but she was offered none.  Thus, she welcomed an 
offer by Columbia Professor Hans Smit, the founding director of 
Columbia Law School’s Project on International Procedure, to 
research and prepare a chapter on Sweden’s new code of civil 
procedure as part of a comparative analysis of foreign legal systems’ 
procedural codes.  She agreed, traveled to Sweden, learned Swedish, 
and co-authored the study with Anders Bruzelius, a Swedish judge.46   
After returning from Europe, in 1960 Ginsburg accepted a 
full-time teaching position at Rutgers Law School, where she taught 
until 1973.47  She was eager, however, to obtain a position at a first-
tier law school.  Harvard, where she had begun legal studies in 1954, 
offered her a visiting position, but she declined because commuting 
from New York would have been arduous.  She became pregnant 
again and gave birth to her son James in 1965.  In 1969, she was 
promoted to full professor, and James entered nursery school.  In 
1972, she got her chance to teach at her alma mater, Columbia; she 
was hired as its first female full professor in 1972 and taught one of 
the first courses in Women’s Law.48   
PIONEERING LITIGATION FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
While teaching law, Ginsburg also worked for years on 
women’s rights litigation for the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
she was a founder of the Women’s Rights Project, which she later 
headed.  At Rutgers, Ginsburg was paid less than a comparable male 
 
44 Her first choice, Learned Hand, would not even consider a female clerk.  DE 
HART, supra note 1, at 80. 
45 Id. at 80-84. 
46 Id. at 85-89.  Berzelius’s daughter had been a Kent Scholar at Columbia Law 
School.  Id. at 85. 
47 Id. at 90-99.  
48 The New York Times headline in January 1972 read “Columbia Law Snares a 
Prize in its Quest for Women Professors.”  Id. at 139. 
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professor who had a family to support.  Dean Willard Heckel 
rationalized that practice because Ruth’s husband earned a good 
salary.49  As a Rutgers professor, Ginsburg became active in litigating 
cases brought by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  At 
the ACLU she relied upon three other pioneer crusaders for women’s 
rights.  Dorothy Kenyon had combated discrimination against women 
as a member of the ACLU national executive board and chair of the 
Women’s Rights Committee since the 1930s.50  Kenyon favored 
utilizing the equal protection clause to combat laws and practices 
which discriminated against women, however benevolent their 
ostensible purposes were.  She had worked in the ACLU for decades 
on this project and was joined in 1965 on the executive board by 
Pauli Murray.51  According to De Hart, Kenyon and Murray 
“intensely … wanted to bring an equal protection case before the 
Court.”52  The third woman was Harriet Pilpel.53   
Ginsburg built on the pioneering efforts and legal analysis of 
these women in using the equal protection clause to advance 
women’s rights.  During the first eight decades following passage of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which was enacted in 1868 to protect the 
rights of freed slaves, its application had been limited to racial 
discrimination: The Supreme Court had never upheld a claim that the 
equal protection clause prohibited gender discrimination.  Inspired by 
the legal work of Murray and Kenyon, Ginsburg was a lead attorney 
in several major court cases in the 1970s which pioneered this area of 
litigation.  Her victories in the Supreme Court changed this field of 
law forever.  As two law professors conclude: 
Between 1970 and 1980, social movement advocacy 
and brilliant litigation by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
 
49 IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, THE NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 46-47 (2015). 
50 DE HART, supra note 1, at 129-30. 
51 Murray, a remarkable woman of color, had graduated from Howard Law School 
in 1944; she was awarded a Rosenthal Fellowship for graduate study at Harvard 
Law School but was rejected because of her sex.  She earned a Master of Law 
degree from Boalt Hall (Berkley) Law School and was the first Black woman to 
earn a J.S.D. (a doctorate in jurisprudence) from Yale, which honored her by 
naming a new undergraduate residence hall for her in 2017.  Id. at 130-33. See also 
supra note 41.  
52 Id. at 148.  Reed v. Reed was to present that opportunity. 
53 Pilpel had crusaded for birth control and the right to use contraception since the 
1930s and was counsel for Planned Parenthood.  DE HART, supra note 1, at 180. 
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others changed our Constitutional law.  Cases 
beginning with Reed v. Reed demonstrated that in 
important respects, sex was like race: familiar 
justifications for excluding women rested on 
stereotypes that denied individuals the opportunity to 
compete and relegated women to secondary status in 
American Society.54 
American law and cultural tradition had presumed that law 
and other professions were the domain of men, while women’s 
proper place was in the home, rearing children and managing the 
household.  The Supreme Court in 1869 rejected the claim that the 
Illinois Supreme Court was violating the Equal Protection Clause of 
the new Fourteenth Amendment when it denied a woman a license to 
practice law.55  With minor exceptions, every state denied women the 
right to vote until passage of the Twentieth Amendment in 1920. 
Ginsburg was a tireless legal researcher and thinker.  She and 
her husband Marty, who although he was a tax lawyer sometimes 
litigated with her, watched the news attentively for accounts of 
persons who felt that they had suffered discrimination because of 
gender.  If the facts and circumstances presented a promising case, 
they sometimes reached out on behalf of the Women’s Rights Project 
to offer the person legal services and financial support.   Ruth 
shrewdly brought a couple of cases on behalf of male plaintiffs who 
had suffered discrimination because of gender stereotypes embedded 
in the law; she recognized that male judges might empathize more 
with them than with female plaintiffs.56   
Reed v. Reed57 the first case, involved a contest between the 
adoptive parents of a young man who committed suicide at his 
father’s house.  The parents were divorced.  Both parents applied to 
administer their son’s modest estate, but Idaho law provided that 
“males must be preferred to females” in such cases, and the trial court 
rejected Sally Reed’s application to be the administrator.58  
 
54 Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From 
Struck to Carhart, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1095 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
55 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873).  Bradwell’s failure was not 
permanent; Illinois later changed the law, and she was admitted to the Illinois Bar 
near the end of her life.  
56 Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636 (1973); Moritz, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). 
57 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
58 Id. at 73 (citing IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 1). 
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Ginsburg’s appeal on behalf of Sally Reed was victorious in the 
Idaho District Court, but its decision was reversed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court.59  The United States Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed the Idaho decision, holding for the first time that such 
discrimination on the basis of gender violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60  
The first case that Ginsburg herself argued in the United 
States Supreme Court was Frontiero v. Richardson.61  Sharon 
Frontiero, a physical therapist at Maxwell Air Force Base Hospital in 
Montgomery, Alabama, was denied a housing allowance supplement 
to her paycheck which would have been given to similarly situated 
males.  Her husband Joseph, a navy veteran, was a full-time college 
student who also needed medical and dental benefits.  Joseph 
received a modest monthly veteran’s payment and earned $30.00 a 
month working as a night watchman.  In order to receive a housing 
allowance supplement, married female members of the armed 
services had to meet a higher financial support level for their spouse 
than was required of married male members.  Ginsburg challenged 
the constitutionality of a statute which allowed a male serviceman to 
claim his spouse as a dependent but denied that right to 
servicewomen.62  The case ended in a major victory for the ACLU, as 
the Supreme Court agreed with Ginsburg that the statute endorsed 
stereotypical views of husbands as providers, unlike wives, and thus 
evinced “romantic paternalism” which violated equal protection.63 
In another landmark case, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,64 the 
ACLU represented a man whose deceased wife died in childbirth 
after having paid Social Security taxes.  It successfully challenged the 
denial of survivors benefits to the widower, who had been denied 
benefits that were given to widows of husbands who had contributed 
to Social Security.  The deceased wife had been the primary 
breadwinner for the family, and the Supreme Court held unanimously 
that the statute violated equal protection when it denied survivors 
benefits to the widower and his infant son.65  Ginsburg argued the 
 
59 Id. at 74. 
60 DE HART, supra note 1, at 181-82. 
61 411 U.S. 677 (1971). 
62 DE HART, supra note 1, at 197. 
63 The Supreme Court decided the case on May 14, 1973.  Id. at 214. 
64 420 U.S. 636 (1973). 
65 DE HART, supra note 1, at 241-45.  A three-judge court ruled in his favor in 
December 1973. 
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case before the Supreme Court in January 1975, and she then rushed 
back to New York to teach her 2:00 p.m. class.  On March 19, the 
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed her trial court victory.66 
Professor Ginsburg was the lead ACLU litigator in these 
cases, working with Legal Director Melvin Wulf and Executive 
Director Aryeh Neier.  Her husband Marty worked with her on 
Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,67 representing a man 
whose mother required fulltime medical care.68  IRS regulations 
provided that single women could get a tax reduction for the 
considerable costs of such care, whereas this was denied to a single 
man like Moritz.  The Ginsburgs, who persuaded Moritz to let them 
take his case, argued in Moritz that the differential treatment of 
Moritz and similarly situated women was unlawful since it was based 
on stereotypical gender role expectations, but the United States Tax 
Court nevertheless upheld the regulation.  On appeal, however, the 
Tenth Circuit reversed and ruled in favor of plaintiff Moritz.69 
By the end of the 1970s, Ginsburg had litigated six cases in 
the Supreme Court and had won five.  She was recognized as the 
leading authority on women and the law.  Another case which might 
have made history, however, was never decided by the Supreme 
Court: Struck v. Secretary of Defense.70  Susan Struck was an 
unmarried captain in the Air Force who became pregnant in 
December 1970 while serving in Vietnam.  She was shipped back to 
McChord Air Force Base in Washington state and immediately 
received discharge orders: An Air Force regulation provided for 
prompt dismissal of an officer who got pregnant, although the Air 
Force would not dismiss her if she terminated the pregnancy. 
Struck, a Roman Catholic who was opposed to abortion, 
wanted to carry her pregnancy to term, surrender the baby for 
adoption and then resume her military career.  However, another Air 
Force regulation provided that a commissioned officer would be 
promptly terminated if she gave birth to a living child.71  She turned 
to ACLU lawyers in Washington State, who brought an action 
 
66 Id. at 247-51. 
67 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). 
68 DE HART, supra note 1, at 126-29, 133-34. 
69 Id. at 11. 
70 Id. at 179-96 (“The Case That Got Away”); Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 
1372 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).  
71 Id. at 179. 
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challenging the constitutionality of her discharge in the federal 
district court for the Western District of Washington and applied for a 
stay of her discharge until her case could be heard.  In the meantime, 
she gave birth to a daughter on December 3, 1970, and surrendered 
the child to the adoptive parents. 
Her attorneys argued that the regulation was unconstitutional 
since it violated both her First Amendment free exercise rights and 
her Fifth Amendment right to due process, and they sought a 
permanent injunction against her dismissal from the service.  Two 
months after she gave birth, the court dismissed her case, holding the 
air force regulation constitutional.  In November 1971, a divided 
Ninth Circuit court affirmed the lower court’s decision, and Robert 
Creisler, her attorney, turned to Ginsburg, who agreed to represent 
Struck. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Ginsburg filed the 
appellate brief in her capacity as General Counsel for the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project.72  She had long believed that discrimination 
against pregnant women was a core case of sex discrimination.  Men 
were encouraged to procreate and suffered no damage to their 
military careers but instead received salary raises.  In the normal 
case, moreover, women were able to return to full duties shortly after 
giving birth.  Courts had traditionally exalted pregnancy and 
motherhood as a separate track for women warranting different 
treatment; while this ostensibly had a benign purpose, Ginsburg 
argued that its effect was to restrain women from developing their 
individual talents and capacities.73  The result, she contended, was to 
reinforce traditional sex stereotypes and to deny women equal 
protection of the laws, rather than making individualized assessments 
of women who were fully able to serve. 
If the case had been decided by the Supreme Court, 
Ginsburg’s Supreme Court brief in Struck might have changed 
history and presaged a different course in women’s rights litigation.  
Instead, the Air Force changed its regulation and Solicitor General 
Erwin Griswold applied to have the Struck appeal dismissed as 
 
72 The sagacious arguments that Ginsburg used in her brief in Struck to challenge 
laws treating people differently by gender on equal protection grounds are outlined 
in Siegel & Siegel, supra note 54. 
73 Id.  
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moot.74  Struck’s mandatory dismissal from military service was 
reversed, and her career was restored.  Ginsburg agreed that this 
outcome was a just result which her client Struck welcomed; 
however, it meant the end of an opportunity for her to make a perhaps 
historic Supreme Court argument.  Ginsburg had not anticipated the 
Solicitor General’s bold stroke.  Her biographer comments:  
Ginsburg was thus deprived of her first chance for a 
Supreme Court victory in the 1972-73 term, in what 
was to have been a pairing of cases.  Most 
importantly, she had lost her opening wedge in an 
effort to get the Court to understand pregnancy 
discrimination as sex discrimination.  Gone too was 
any hope of using Struck to nudge the justices closer 
to a view of reproductive freedom as an issue of 
liberty and equality.  The clock had run out.75    
Meanwhile, separate challenges to statutes outlawing abortion were 
moving through the federal courts.76  Sarah R. Weddington, counsel 
for a pregnant woman who wanted an abortion, challenged the Texas 
statute as a violation of her client’s marital right of privacy under the 
Ninth Amendment, which had been recognized by the Court in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.77  A three-judge federal district court held 
in her favor, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Another 
three-judge federal district court in Georgia had struck down parts of 
the Georgia abortion statute.78  Certiorari was also granted in the 
 
74 In the interests of resolving important legal issues despite the fact that the 
individual plaintiff’s stake in litigation has inevitably been rendered moot by the 
passage of time, as in a case concerning a pregnancy, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes permitted an otherwise moot case to be pursued to conclusion on the 
ground that it raised an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”  United 
States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018).  Despite her 
disappointment that Struck’s case had been rendered moot, Ginsburg evidently did 
not seek to prevent its dismissal on these grounds.  
75 DE HART, supra note 1, at 188.  Before it was dismissed as moot, the Struck case 
had been calendared for consideration together with Roe v. Wade and Doe v. 
Bolton. 
76 Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Texas 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 379 F. Supp. 
1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).  The Texas statute proscribed all abortions except where it 
was necessary to save the life of the mother.  
77 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
78 Doe, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).  Georgia had adopted the model statute 
drafted by the American Law Institute, which replaced an 1876 statute similar to 
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Georgia case, which was consolidated for argument with Roe v. 
Wade. 
 
While Sarah Weddington in the Texas case apparently did not 
consult the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, Margie Hames, a 
member of the ACLU’s national board who led the Atlanta team that 
successfully challenged the Georgia statute did so.  ACLU Legal 
Director Melvin Wulf received the Doe v. Bolton brief and referred it 
to Ginsburg for her assessment.  After reviewing the brief, she 
concluded that the writing was not up to ACLU standards, and she 
believed that a stronger, explicit right to abortion based on the 
Constitution was required, rather than the weaker implied right.79  
Arguments on Roe and Doe originally took place on 
December 13, 1971,80 but there was little agreement among the 
justices when the Court met in conference to discuss the two cases.  
Thus, it was agreed to schedule re-argument of the two cases for 
October 11, 1972, which would allow newly appointed Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist to take part.  Struck was originally placed on 
the calendar for the same day before it was dismissed as moot.81  
Following the second argument on October 11, 1972, the 
Court held by seven to two on January 22, 1973, in Roe v. Wade that 
the Texas abortion statute was unconstitutional because it violated 
Roe’s implied right of privacy.82  On the same day, the Court in Doe 
v. Bolton invalidated Georgia’s law limiting abortion, which was 
based on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code. 
New York and three other states had legalized abortion by 
statute, but the Supreme Court’s decision evidently struck down the 
other forty-six states’ abortion laws.  Many champions of abortion 
law repeal greeted the decision with jubilation.  Harriet Pilpel, chair 
of the National Abortion Rights Action League, said that the Roe 
decision, when combined with Doe, was “far broader in scope than 
anyone expected . . . It scaled the whole mountain. . . We expected to 
get there, but not on the first trip . . .”83  Many legal scholars, 
 
the Texas statute challenged in Roe v. Wade.  The ALI statute increased the legal 
grounds for seeking abortions.  
79 DE HART, supra note 1, at 18; Doe, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
80 DE HART, supra note 1, at 185. 
81 Id. at 184-86. 
82 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
83 DE HART, supra note 1, at 190. 
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including Ginsburg, were less ecstatic and found the opinion 
“woefully short on law.”84  Yale Law Professor John Hart Ely, who 
favored the right to abortion as a policy, criticized the Supreme Court 
opinion as not even law.85 
Ginsburg and numerous other prominent legal scholars were 
disappointed that equal protection was missing from the Court’s 
holding.86  Among this group, all of whom favored a woman’s right 
to an abortion, were Catherine MacKinnon, Rhonda Copelon, Reva 
Siegel, Robin West, Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Karst, and Laurence 
Tribe.87  
THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
Over the years as a law professor and successful litigator in 
the Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg had reflected on what she 
could accomplish as a federal judge.  The election of Democrat 
Jimmy Carter as president in 1976, after the Nixon and Ford 
presidencies, and the enactment of the Omnibus Judgeship Act in 
1978 presented an opportunity for liberal judicial candidates.  The 
statute created thirty-five circuit judgeships, and President Carter had 
made a commitment to remedy the tiny number of women judges.88  
As a former clerk to Southern District of New York Judge 
Palmieri with New York ties, Ginsburg desired a seat on the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  She enjoyed the loyal support of her 
husband Marty, and many letter writers also testified to her superior 
qualifications.  In January 1979, she submitted her responses to the 
questionnaire for the Second Circuit and another one for the D.C. 
Circuit.  Unfortunately, an all-male panel comprised of business 
lawyers discerned that she was unfamiliar with securities laws and 
disapproved her Second Circuit application.89 
She fared better with respect to the D.C. Circuit.  While she 
might not otherwise have considered that option, she received a direct 
invitation to apply from Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, who 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (citing John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920, 947 (1973)). 
86 Id. at 193.   
87 Id. at 184. 
88 There were only eleven female judges out of five hundred and five federal judge 
positions.  Id. at 277. 
89 Id. at 281.  
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chaired the selection committee.  Her candidacy was supported by 
scores of letters from her Columbia colleagues and other prominent 
lawyers.90  The National Organization of Women’s Legal Defense 
Fund, The Women’s Equity Action League and the National 
Women’s Political Caucus all endorsed her appointment, as did 
Erwin Griswold, District Judge Palmieri, Gerald Gunther, Columbia 
Executive Vice President and Former Columbia Law School Dean 
Michael Sovern and his successor Dean Albert J. Rosenthal.91 
Her name was on the list of eight nominees sent to the White 
House, but she was not one of the two selected.92  After D.C. Circuit 
Judge Harold Leventhal died, however, her prospects improved, 
although some liberals questioned the support of Carter and Attorney 
General Benjamin Civiletti for her in light of her strong women’s law 
background.  After months of anxious waiting, Ginsburg was 
informed on April 8, 1980, that Carter had signed her nomination.93  
On June 17, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted eight to one to 
recommend her, and full Senate ratification swiftly followed.  In late 
June, Ginsburg was sworn in by Judge Skelly Wright as the newest 
judge of the D.C. Circuit.94  
Her diligent and thorough preparation and keen legal mind 
quickly won her acclaim among the bar and the respect of her 
colleagues.  Her companionship with arch-conservative Judge 
Antonin Scalia, despite near total disagreement on legal issues, 
became legendary.  They enjoyed dinner engagements and listening 
to opera together.  Ginsburg’s legal reputation grew during the 
ensuing twelve years of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
administrations. 
By the time Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, she was on the 
top of a list of “leading centrists” in a survey of prospective 
Democratic appointees to the United States Supreme Court.95  Since 
no one retired or died during his administration, however, Carter was 
the only president in recent history who had no opportunity to 
appoint a Supreme Court justice. 
 
90 Id. at 281-82. 
91 Id. at 282. 
92 Id. 
93 Ginsburg received the highest rating for judicial candidates from the American 
Bar Association.  Id. at 290. 
94 Id. at 291-92.  
95 Id. at 298-99. 
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The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 gave Democrats the first 
opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court Justice since Lyndon 
Johnson had appointed Thurgood Marshall in 1967.96  Ginsburg’s 
outstanding judicial reputation was universally admired, but there 
was one possible reservation among liberal Democrats: her view of 
Roe v. Wade.  As noted above, her analysis about the best litigation 
strategy to secure advancement of abortion rights in the Supreme 
Court was based on the equal protection clause rather than on the 
right to privacy.  Moreover, since she had litigated the Struck case all 
the way to the Supreme Court before it became moot in 1972, she had 
not changed her approach twenty years later.  
THE MADISON LECTURE 
Ginsburg had accepted an invitation to present the annual 
Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University Law 
School on March 9, 1993.  When she gave her speech, Justice 
White’s resignation was believed to be imminent.  When he did 
resign on March 19th, there was widespread public support for her as 
his successor.  However, the Roe v. Wade decision, which she had 
criticized, had been regarded by pro-choice Democrats for twenty 
years as a great liberal landmark.  Thus, she might have enhanced her 
likelihood of being nominated if she had tailored her remarks to show 
deference and respect for the decision, but she did not do so; instead, 
she remained faithful to the views she had held when she litigated the 
Struck case.  
Ginsburg began the Madison Lecture by stating that she had 
two main themes: human rights and the administration of justice, 
particularly in the federal courts.  She noted that her views had been 
shaped by her years as a “law teacher” in the 1960s and 70s who had 
helped to launch the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project and her time 
as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit since 1980.97 
The first half of Ginsburg’s speech compared American 
appellate courts with European courts and indicated that, in her view, 
appellate judges should behave with moderation and in creating law 
 
96 According to De Hart, “By 1991, Ginsburg had jumped to the top in a survey of 
“leading centrists” likely to be considered for the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 298-99. 
97 Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1185.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had presented 
the NYU Madison Lecture one year earlier.  See id. at 1202. 
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should generally limit themselves to making “interstitial” decisions.  
She cited with approval Justice Brennan’s statement defending 
appellate judges’ exercise of their prerogative to dissent from 
majority opinions but noted that legal scholar Roscoe Pound decades 
earlier had decried “intemperate denunciations of . . . colleagues, 
violent invective, attributi[on]s of bad motives to the majority of the 
court, and insinuations of incompetence, negligence, prejudice or 
obtuseness of [other judges].”98  She then quoted examples of 
excessively intemperate remarks in dissents by her friend Justice 
Scalia and D.C. Circuit colleague Judge Abner Mikva.99 
The second part of Ginsburg’s address was captioned 
“MEASURED MOTIONS IN THIRD BRANCH DECISION 
MAKING.”100  Ginsburg stated that: 
Moving from the style to the substance of third branch 
decision-making, I will stress in the remainder of these 
remarks that judges play an interdependent part in our 
democracy.  They do not alone shape legal doctrine 
but, as I suggested at the outset, they participate in a 
dialogue with other organs of government and with the 
people as well.101 
She noted that Justice Holmes had “recognize[d] without hesitation” 
that judges “do and must legislate,” but “they can do so . . . only 
interstitially . . . .”102  She suggested: “Measured motions seem to me 
right, in the main, for constitutional as well as common law 
adjudication.  Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, 
may prove unstable.  The most prominent example in recent decades 
is Roe v. Wade.”103 
To “illustrate” her point, she “[h]ad contrasted that 
breathtaking 1973 decision with the Court’s more cautious 
dispositions, contemporaneous with Roe, in cases involving explicitly 
sex-based classifications …” and “[would] further develop that 
comparison here.”104  She noted that the Roe decision had struck 
 
98 Id. at 1194 (citing Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial 
Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794, 795 (1953)). 
99 Id. at 1194-95. 
100 Id. at 1198. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1198 (footnotes omitted). 
104 Id. 
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down on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds “a Texas 
criminal abortion statute that intolerably shackled a woman’s 
autonomy”; the only exception was when abortion was necessary to 
save the woman’s life.  She continued: 
Suppose the Court had stopped there, rightly declaring 
unconstitutional the most extreme brand of law in the 
nation, and had not gone on, as the Court did in Roe, 
to fashion a law blanketing the subject, a set of rules 
that displaced virtually every state law then in force.  
Would there have been the twenty-year controversy 
we have witnessed, reflected most recently in the 
Supreme Court’s splintered decision in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey?  A less encompassing Roe, one 
that merely struck down the extreme Texas law and 
went no further on that day, I believe and will 
summarize why, might have served to reduce rather 
than to fuel controversy.105    
She further suggested that Roe v. Wade might have been “less of a 
storm center had it . . . homed in more precisely on the women’s 
equality dimension of the issue and, correspondingly, attempted 
nothing more bold than the mode of decision making the Court 
employed in the 1970s gender classification cases.”106  Ginsburg 
went on to describe the Struck case, that could have usefully linked 
“reproductive choice” to “disadvantageous treatment of women on 
the basis of their sex.”107 
Ginsburg noted that originally “the Air Force regime 
differentiated invidiously by allowing men who became fathers, but 
not women who became mothers, to remain in service” and by 
allowing women who underwent abortions but not women who gave 
birth to continue their military careers.108  She noted that the Air 
Force had abandoned its regulation and had thereby given Struck a 
total victory on the merits, which warranted the case’s dismissal 
because of mootness.  Moreover, while the Supreme Court majority 
had not voted to make sex-based classifications a suspect category for 
equal protection purposes, it had adopted her “fallback” suggestion of 
 
105 Id. at 1199. 
106 Id. at 1200. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1201. 
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an elevated, “intermediate” level of scrutiny for such classifications 
that was more stringent than the “rational relationship” test for most 
legislation.109  Thus, the Supreme Court could have continued the 
“dialogue” that its earlier 1970s decisions had opened with the 
political branches of government, to ensure that laws and regulations 
“would catch up with a changed world.”110  While, as she noted, 
abortion law “was in a state of change across the nation” toward 
“liberalization” of the laws,111 “Roe v. Wade invited no dialogue with 
legislators.”112  
Nevertheless, Roe was not “measured,” since it “left virtually 
no state with laws fully conforming to the Court’s delineation of 
abortion still permissible.113  Around that extraordinary decision, a 
well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement rallied and 
succeeded, for a considerable time, in turning the legislative tide to 
the opposite direction.”114  In a similar vein, former Yale Law 
Professor Geoffrey Hazard observed: “By making such an extensive 
change, the court [in Roe] foreclosed the usual opportunities for 
assimilation [and] feedback . . . that are afforded in a decisional 
process involving shorter and more cautious doctrinal steps.”115   
Ginsburg emphasized that “Constitutional review by courts is 
an institution that has been for some two centuries our nation’s 
hallmark and pride.”116  But she believed that two “extreme modes of 
court intervention in social change processes” in the twentieth 
century had placed stress on the process: “At one extreme, the 
Supreme Court steps boldly in front of the political process, as some 
believe it did in Roe;”117 at the other extreme the Court, in the early 
part of the century, “thrust” itself into “the rearguard opposing 
change, striking down, as unconstitutional, laws embodying a new 
 
109 Id. at 1202. 





115 Id. at n. 129 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 153, 166 (1986)).  
116 Id. at 1205. 
117 Id. at 1206. 
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philosophy of economic regulation at odds with the nineteenth 
century’s laissez-faire approach.”118    
 
Ginsburg compared the development of civil rights law 
following Brown v. Board of Education119 to the 1970s development 
of women’s equal rights cases.  The Court’s decisions broadening 
women’s rights in the 1970s had helped to educate society on 
women’s subordination and had made possible a gradual expansion 
of those rights.  In contrast, Blacks “were confined in a separate 
sector” of society and prospects were bleak for renouncing the 
“separate but equal” doctrine and “apartheid” that it embodied,120 so 
that justified the Supreme Court’s stepping ahead of the political 
branches “in pursuit of a constitutional precept” as in Brown v. Board 
of Education.121  
Ginsburg suggested that while the Supreme Court Justices 
“…generally follow, they do not lead, changes taking place 
elsewhere in society…” sometimes they can effectively “signal a 
green light for a social change.” 122  “Roe, on the other hand, halted a 
political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I 
believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the 
issue.”123  Maybe in consequence of that error, she suggested, the 
most recent (at that time) abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,124 had retreated from Roe and lessened women’s rights.125   
Ginsburg concluded by recalling the wise counsel that her 
“teacher and friend,” Professor Gerald Gunther, had offered when she 
was installed as a judge in 1980:    
The good judge . . . is open-minded and detached . . . 
heedful of limitations stemming from the judge’s own 
competence and, above all, from the presuppositions 
of our constitutional scheme; th[at] judge . . . 
 
118 Id.  The reference is obviously to the substantive due process jurisprudence 
typified by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Id. at n. 132. 
119 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
120 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
121 Id.; see also U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (the 
famous footnote 4 about “discrete and insular minorities”). 
122 Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1208. 
123 Id. at 1206.  At present, continued divisiveness in America about abortion is still 
strong nearly fifty years after the Roe decision in 1973. 
124 505 U.S. 995 (2003). 
125 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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recognizes that a felt need to act only interstitially 
does not mean relegation of judges to a trivial or 
mechanical role, but rather affords the most 
responsible room for creative, important judicial 
contributions.”126    
 
Ginsburg explained that “Professor Gunther had in mind a great 
jurist, Judge Learned Hand,” whose biography he was completing at 
that time.127  
The modest, measured tone of Gunther’s description of “the 
good judge” is striking.  Gunther passed up the opportunity to shower 
his protégé with praise (Ginsburg knew how greatly he respected and 
indeed admired her).  Instead, I think he was holding up the model of 
the good common law judge, and his model was Hand, for whom he 
had clerked.128  
Two weeks before the invasion of Normandy on “D Day,” 
whose success spelled doom for the Third Reich tyranny, the great 
judge Learned Hand had addressed almost one and a half million 
people in New York’s Central Park at the annual “I am an American” 
day.  His speech on May 21, 1944 contained the following famous 
words:  
 
126 Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1209. 
127 Gunther had clerked for Judge Learned Hand (1872-1961) on the Second Circuit 
in 1953-54 after he graduated from Columbia Law School.  His biography of Hand, 
which totaled eight hundred pages and clearly constituted a labor of love, was 
published in 1994; a second edition with a preface by Ginsburg was published in 
2011.  GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND, THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).  
Ginsburg was too gracious to mention that Hand had been her first choice for a 
clerkship when she received her Columbia law degree in 1959, a position for which 
he would not consider a woman. 
128 Learned Hand majored in philosophy at Harvard Collee, graduating Phi Beta 
Kappa with highest honors, was awarded an Artium Magister degree as well as an 
Artium Baccalaureus degree, and was chosen by his classmates to deliver the Class 
Day oration.  He also graduated with an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1896.  
Following an unsuccessful stint as a practicing lawyer, he was appointed a federal 
district judge for the Southern District of New York at the young age of thirty-
seven in 1909 and was appointed to the Second Circuit in 1924.  His distinguished 
law school professors included James Bradley Thayer, Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, Samuel Williston, John Chipman Gray, and James Barr Ames.  
GUNTHER, supra note 127 at 32; KATHRYN GRIFFITH, JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND 
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (1973). 
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     What then is the spirit of Liberty?  I cannot define 
it; I can only tell you my own faith.  The Spirit of 
liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right; 
the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to 
understand the minds of other men; the spirit of liberty 
is the spirit which weighs their interests alongside its 
own without bias . . .129 
The hesitancy to be certain that he was right influenced Learned 
Hand throughout his long federal judicial career.  He was a strong 
supporter of civil rights and freedom of speech, often opposing public 
opinion.  One of his most famous decisions as district judge was 
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,130 in which he ruled in favor of a 
radical magazine which was charged with violation of the Sedition 
Act when it urged men to resist the draft during World War I.  While 
the decision was widely unpopular and was reversed by the Second 
Circuit, it helped influence Justices Homes and Brandeis, whose 
jurisprudence later evolved towards greater defense of the right to 
advocate unpopular political causes that did not pose a serious threat 
to the peace.131  Nevertheless, because of his scrupulous 
determination to reach just results and his gift for eloquence, he was 
the federal judge whose opinions were the most widely cited by other 
courts during his lifetime.132 
I think that Learned Hand, a universally admired judge, 
served as a role model for Ginsburg during her tenure on both the 
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.  As noted, above, he was her 
first choice as the judge to clerk for after graduating from law school.  
I believe that while she regretted his bias in declining to even 
consider a female clerk, she was nevertheless willing to recognize his 
greatness as a judge.  
 
129 GUNTHER, supra note 127, at 549. 
130 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 216 F. 254 (2d Cir. 1919). 
131 As noted above, he was Ginsburg’s first choice as the judge to clerk for, but he 
never considered hiring a female clerk.  He happened, however, to be free of a 
prejudice that was common among members of the Establishment: antisemitism.  
In 1922, he privately objected to a proposed limit on the number of Jewish students 
admitted to Harvard College.  “If we are to have in this country racial divisions like 
those in Europe,” he wrote, “let us close up shop now.”  GRIFFITH, supra note 128, 
at 362-68 (1973). 
132 Richard A. Posner, The Hand Biography and The Question of Judicial 
Greatness (reviewing Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 
(1994)), 104 Yale Law Journal 511 (1994). 
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To sum up Ginsburg's Madison Address, while her criticism 
of the Roe decision was somewhat oblique, her disagreement was 
unmistakable.  She felt it was “sweeping,” “breathtaking,” and not 
“measured.”  In a 1985 address at the University of North Carolina 
Law School, she observed that the Supreme Court’s cases applying 
equal protection analysis to gender-based classifications which had 
advanced women’s rights had not provoked much controversy.  In 
contrast, the Court in Roe v. Wade “ha[d] treated reproductive 
autonomy under a substantive due process/personal autonomy 
headline, . . .” and the case became a “storm center,” sparking public 
opposition and academic criticism, “in part, I believe, because the 
Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an 
incomplete justification for its action.”133   
Since the Court had fashioned “a law blanketing the subject, a 
set of rules that displaced virtually every state law then in force,” it 
had missed the opportunity to initiate a dialogue with the Texas 
Legislature on the issues as it could have by merely striking down the 
draconian Texas statute and then waiting for Texas to respond.  She 
noted that Professor Archibald Cox had described Roe’s trimester 
approach as “read[ing] like a set of hospital rules and regulations,”134 
and that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also opposed the trimester 
approach.135  Like many critics of Roe, Ginsburg was in favor of 
abortion rights, although she noted that she “was not at that time or 
any other time thereafter personally engaged in reproductive 
autonomy litigation.”136 
LAW PROFESSORS CRITIQUE ROE V. WADE 
The majority of law professors nationwide probably 
supported the right to an abortion, albeit many found the Supreme 
Court opinion in Roe v. Wade disappointing.  This gave Professor 
 
133 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985). 
134 Id. at 381. 
135 The Court later abandoned the trimester approach, replacing it with an “undue 
burden” standard.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
136 Ginsburg, supra note 133, at 381.  This was likely because in 1971, the Ford 
Foundation, whose financial support the ACLU began to accept, had a strict policy 
that not a penny of its funds could be spent on abortion-related litigation.  DE 
HART, supra note 1, at 161. 
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Jack Balkin of Yale Law School, thirty years later, the idea of 
consulting legal experts on how they would have decided Roe and its 
companion case Doe v. Bolton137 if they had been Supreme Court 
justices in 1973.  Eleven law school professors accepted his invitation 
and made presentations at a symposium in New Haven on how they 
would have decided the case; these were subsequently published.138  
While only three professors opposed the legalization of abortion 
(Michael Stokes Paulsen, Teresa Collett, and Jeffrey Rosen), none of 
the other eight fully approved the reasoning of the 1973 decision, and 
none adopted Justice Blackmun’s original trimester framework.  
Moreover, their pro-abortion rights decisions varied widely.  Given 
the fact that the Roe holding was based on a posited right of privacy 
not anchored in an explicit constitutional provision, this was no doubt 
inevitable.  
Balkin’s own opinion held that abortion statutes violated both 
women’s liberty and equality because they forced women to become 
mothers in a society where they still bear most of the responsibility 
for childcare.  However, state legislatures could set a statutory 
deadline for exercising the right to an abortion, after which they 
could restrict or even completely prohibit abortions.139  Instead, he 
would permit states to experiment with various deadlines for women 
to exercise the abortion right.140  Significantly, in light of his strong 
conviction about the wrongfulness of abortion prohibition statutes, 
Balkin acknowledged how difficult it was to articulate a 
constitutional basis for holding thus: 
Moreover, the question of abortion rights is legally 
difficult and morally complex, bringing together 
issues of life and death, humanity, equality, and 
liberty.  The problems the Justices faced in Roe were 
as trying in their own way as any set of questions that 
come before the courts.  Given the legal and moral 
 
137 413 U.S. 179 (1973). 
138 JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (2005).  The 
professors were instructed not to include consideration of any post-1973 decisions 
or developments.  Professor Balkin included a brief history of Roe v. Wade and the 
controversy it caused at the beginning of What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said.  Id. 
at 3.  
139 Id.at 17-18.  His opinion “reject[ed] the rigid trimester system in Roe . . .”  Id. at 
19. 
140 Id. at 19. 
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difficulty of the issues and the inevitable need to make 
compromises, it was perhaps too much to expect that 
the Court would get it right the first time, under almost 
anyone’s standards of what ‘getting it right’ might 
mean . . .141 
 
Instead, he suggested, the Court “might have developed its ideas more 
fully over a course of decisions, perhaps in tandem with its sex-
equality jurisprudence;” and while that probably would not have made 
abortion uncontroversial, “it might have produced a fairer, more 
flexible, and more democratically acceptable set of legal doctrines.”142  
In addition, Balkin said that the Justices should have 
recognized that their decision was bound to cause “a significant 
upheaval in American politics” and should have tried harder to win 
public support and assuage criticism . . .”143  He commended Chief 
Justice Warren’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,144 another 
extremely controversial decision that effected historic change, as “a 
model of eloquence and understatement, brief and statesmanlike, 
fully aware of its political context and deliberately designed to avoid 
confrontation and to conserve the Court’s legitimacy . . .”145  In 
contrast, Blackmun’s decisions in Roe and Doe, while full of 
scholarship and medical history, were “long-winded” and “devote[d] 
a very significant amount of space to technical legal issues.”146  
Indeed, “Blackmun’s opinion in Roe was so complicated that 
Blackmun himself at one point contemplated writing an addendum 
explaining its meaning.”147   
Echoing Justice Ginsburg’s approach in her Madison Address, 
Balkin concluded that “[p]erhaps Roe’s most important shortcoming 
was not its failure to ‘get it right’ but its relative inattention to the 
interactions between courts and politics “and to how courts, whether 
they like it or not, always work in conversation with the political 
branches in developing constitutional norms.”148  And while courts 
 
141 Id. at 22-24. 
142 Id. at 23. 
143 Id.  
144 347 U.S. 483 (1954)   
145 BALKIN, supra note 138, at 23.  
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often have to protect rights from political interference, “those rights . 
. . also arise out of politics, they are tested by politics, and they are 
modified by courts as a result of politics.”149  Balkin concluded: 
Despite the attention that has been paid to Roe, the 
constitutional right to abortion, as it exists today, is 
not solely the work of the federal judiciary.  Like all 
important constitutional ideas, it is the work of a 
dialectical process that engages all the major 
institutions of American lawmaking, and it has been 
fashioned through controversy and strife, through trial 
and error – and with many mistakes and hesitations 
along the way – out of the raw materials of American 
politics.150 
Among the other law professors’ model opinions, Reva Siegel 
argued that the proper basis of the abortion right is women’s equality 
and that abortion is a constitutional right necessary to secure 
women’s equal citizenship.151  Mark Tushnet believed that the all-
male Supreme Court justices of 1973 did not understand the 
connection between abortion rights and the Equal Protection Clause.  
He based his opinion on Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Doe v. 
Bolton, which Justice Brennan had joined.152 
Four other participants, Anita Allen, Robin West, Jed 
Rubenfeld and Cass Sunstein, concurred in the judgment that both the 
Texas and Georgia statutes were unconstitutional, but for different 
reasons.  Anita Allen grounded her opinion on women’s procreative 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.153  Jed Rubenfeld argued 
that the constitutional right to privacy is part of a “general prohibition 
against totalitarian policies that take over people’s private lives” and 
“conscript women, forcing them ‘to carry out a specific, sustained, 
long-term, life-altering and life-occupying course of conduct.”’154  
Robin West argued that restrictions on abortion violated both 
women’s liberty and their equality, imposing on them duties of “good 
samaritanship” that states do not impose on any other persons.  She 
 
149 Id. at 23-24. 
150 Id. at 24. 
151 Id. at 19. 
152 Id. at 21. 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
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thought that Congress is the best body to enact laws that would 
protect women’s equality and would secure their equal citizenship.155 
Cass Sunstein believes in a theory he calls judicial 
minimalism, in which courts should ordinarily decide cases on 
narrow grounds and leave many things undecided and thereby act as 
catalysts for democratic deliberation.  He supported the results in Roe 
and Doe on the grounds that abortion statutes were overbroad since 
they abridged too much constitutionally protected liberty.156  
Jeffrey Rosen dissented from both Roe and Doe because he 
believed that the right of privacy has no basis in the Constitution and 
that the Supreme Court should have left the issue of abortion rights to 
legislatures.  He agreed with many of the arguments made by John 
Hart Ely against Roe v. Wade and believed that the hasty and ill-
considered decision in Roe simply exacerbated political division and 
might have undermined the trend towards protection of abortion 
rights before the 1973 decision.157 
Akhil Amar had an interesting position: He concluded that the 
Texas abortion statute in Roe was unconstitutional since it was 
enacted in the 1850s, while women only obtained the right to vote 
with passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.  In contrast, he 
believed that the Court should have abstained from adjudicating the 
Georgia statute, passed in 1968, which was challenged in Doe v. 
Bolton, and left its interpretation to the Georgia courts. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen believes that abortion is deeply 
immoral and that the Supreme Court has severely damaged its 
authority by declaring it to be a fundamental right and thereby 
becoming complicit in the destruction of so many innocent human 
lives.158  He states that “[p]lainly, abortion kills a living being,” and 
 
155 Id. at 20-21. 
156 Id. at 20. 
157 Id.  Rosen met Ginsburg in an elevator when he was clerking for another judge 
on the D.C. Circuit in 1991.  He wanted to make her acquaintance, so he asked her 
if she had seen any good operas recently. She responded with enthusiasm.  She 
loved operas, and this led to a strong friendship.  In 1993, he wrote an unsolicited 
assessment of potential nominees to the Supreme Court and ranked her “as the top 
candidate with the strongest support from both liberals and conservatives.”  DE 
HART, supra note 1, at 317.  Given his close friendship with Ginsburg, it is 
significant that he opposed both Roe and Doe and thought the abortion issue should 
be left to legislatures.  Rosen published Conversations with RBG: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg on Life, Love, Liberty, and Law (2019).   
158 BALKIN, supra note 138, at 22. 
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“[i]t is equally plain that the living being killed by an abortion is a 
human living being” and “[t]he act of abortion thus ends a human 
life.”159  He argued that “[i]t is somewhat amusing (but also 
somewhat pathetic and dispiriting) to observe the other members of 
the Court flailing around, so desperately and so very creatively—and 
so inconsistently with one another!—and with such evident desire to 
reach a predetermined preferred result, trying to torture an argument 
out of the Constitution’s text in support of a ‘right’ of some kind . . . 
to kill human beings gestating in their mothers’ wombs.”160  
Teresa Collett argued that Roe is the product of a misguided 
radical individualism that undermines women’s liberty and equality.  
She contends that making abortion freely available allows men to 
escape responsibility for sex and parenthood and treats women’s 
bodies as something unnatural and something to be altered to 
conform to the male model.161 
JUDGE WILKINSON’S CRITIQUE OF ROE V. WADE 
A detailed and rather devastating critique of Roe v. Wade was 
written by United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson, who was equally caustic about District of 
Columbia v. Heller,162 the radical decision in which the Supreme 
Court held for the first time since the ratification of the Second 
Amendment that there was an individual constitutional right to own 
guns at least in the District of Columbia, which is a federal entity.163  
Wilkinson criticized both cases for “fashioning novel 
substantive rights,” “descending into the political thicket,” “ignoring 
the Legislature’s strengths” and “disregarding federalism’s 
virtues.”164  According to Wilkinson:  
Both decisions share four major shortcomings: an 
absence of a commitment to textualism; a willingness 
 
159 Id. at 196. 
160 Id.; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All 
Time, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 995 (2003).  Paulsen’s title refers to Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 995 (2003), which reaffirmed and purported to 
permanently entrench the right to abortion created by Roe v. Wade. 
161 BALKIN, supra note 138, at 22. 
162 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
163 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 
Va. L. Rev. 253 (2009).  The article is 68 pages long and contains 325 footnotes. 
164 Id.  
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to embark on a complex endeavor that will require 
fine tuning over many years of litigation; a failure to 
respect legislative judgments; and a rejection of the 
principles of federalism.  These failings have two 
things in common.  First, each represents a rejection of 
neutral principles that counseled restraint and 
deference to others regardless of the issues involved.  
Second, each represents an act of judicial 
aggrandizement; a transfer of power to judges from 
political branches of government – and thus, 
ultimately, from the people themselves. 165 
Wilkinson charged the Court with creating a “newly 
discovered right to abortion” without any relationship to the text or 
structure of the Constitution,” something they should never have 
done.166  He also gave examples of leading authorities’ criticisms of 
Roe.  Gerald Gunther was unable “to find a satisfying rationale to 
justify Roe . . . on the basis of modes of constitutional interpretation I 
consider legitimate.”167  Alexander Bickel asserted that the Court 
“refused the discipline to which its function is properly subject; it 
simply asserted the result it reached.  This is all the Court could do 
because moral philosophy, logic, reason, or other materials of law” 
could not resolve the question of whether abortion should be 
permitted.”168  Wilkinson concluded that the Roe decision gave rise 
to the modern conservative movement because it violated neutral 
principles of “textualism, structuralism, federalism, historicism and 
plain old modesty and restraint.”169  Richard Epstein flatly labeled the 
decision “comprehensive legislation” which the seven justices had 
“enacted” in the name of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.170 
The Court in Roe had imposed on itself an enormous future 
burden: by 2009, thirty-six years after the 1973 decision, it had 
decided more than twenty-five abortion cases, and lower courts had 
 
165 Id. at 254. 
166 Id. at 258. 
167 Id. at 262. 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 264. 
170 Id. at 262. 
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decided hundreds more.171  Moreover, Wilkinson argued, legislative 
bodies accustomed to compromise and able to study fraught political 
issues over time were better suited to decide them than courts 
deciding individual cases.  As Justice Scalia charged, the Supreme 
Court with its set of detailed regulations ended up creating what 
could accurately be called an “Abortion Code,” i.e., it was in effect 
exercising legislative power which it had no business doing.172  
Justice Rehnquist had labeled the Roe decision “judicial legislation” 
in his original 1973 dissent.173  
Wilkinson proceeded to make a case that it was unwise for the 
Court in Roe to enter the “thicket” of such a controversial and 
politically fraught issue as the right to an abortion, especially when 
there is no clear “constitutional guidance” to assist in resolving 
controversies about the permissible scope of such a right.  For 
instance, numerous states have enacted laws requiring parental 
consent for young girls to receive an abortion but permitting a 
“judicial bypass” if parents unreasonably refuse their consent.  He 
noted that as of 2009, the Supreme Court had considered parental 
consent requirements and judicial bypass procedures eight times in 
sixteen years.174 
Yale Law Professor John Hart Ely had published one of the 
major articles criticizing Roe v. Wade less than a year after the 
decision.175   Abortion rights supporters are outraged by the 
unavailability of abortion facilities in large areas of the country, 
especially in the South, and they do not see why the exercise of a 
constitutional right proclaimed by the Supreme Court half a century 
ago should be nearly impossible in such areas.176  However, Professor 
Ely, while he favored statutory abortion rights, believed that the 
 
171 The 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey had eliminated the trimester 
system at the heart of Roe and had dealt with a startling number of technical issues; 
Wilkinson claimed that the case’s analysis “was detailed, debatable, and 
inescapably arbitrary.”  Id. at 277. 
172 Id. at 261. 
173 Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
174 Wilkinson, supra note 163, at 277.  It seems excessive for such a detailed issue 
to require such frequent judicial review.  
175 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale 
L.J. 920, 947 (1973). 
176 Such regional inconsistencies were of course the norm in the United States 
under the police power prior to the Court’s 1973 decision, and such a pattern might 
resurface if the even more conservative Court with Ginsburg’s successor, new 
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, strikes down Roe v. Wade. 
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Court should not “second guess legislative balances” and disregard 
the lessons of community experience which influence compromises 
resulting from the political process.177  In his dissent in Roe, Justice 
Rehnquist had emphasized the superior ability of legislatures 
studying conflicting claims and complicated medical and scientific 
issues at length, “unconstrained by judicial rules on standing and 
evidence.”178  Others had criticized Roe for ignoring what Justice 
Brandeis had referred to as the “happy incident” of our federal 
system, which permitted the states to serve as natural laboratories for 
experimentation and innovation.179 
Justice Scalia argued that while Americans were deeply and 
rather evenly split on the morality of abortion as a nation, the 
different regions were not representative of the whole, that is, states 
on the coasts tended to be predominantly pro-choice, while rural and 
deep Southern areas were more pro-life.  Thus, leaving the issue to its 
traditional status as part of states’ police power would respect the 
views of the largest number of Americans.  Wilkinson observed that 
legislative bodies were far better suited to dealing through 
compromise with such fraught issues, which they could study over 
long periods, without having to reach a decision in the case.  In 
contrast, courts which are compelled to decide cases had no such 
flexibility, and they have to issue decisions within reasonable time 
frames.180 
“THE GOOD JUDGE” 
I wish to return now to the thought-provoking message which 
Gerald Gunther delivered when Ginsburg was sworn in as an 
appellate judge in December 1980:  
The good judge . . . is open minded and detached . . . 
heedful of limitations stemming from the judge’s own 
competence and, above all, from the presuppositions 
of our constitutional scheme; and [th]at judge . . . 
recognizes that a felt need to act only interstitially 
 
177 Ely, supra note 175, at 923. 
178 Id. at 935, n. 104 (citing Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 BYU 
L. Rev. 231, 238 & n.41).  
179 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
180 Wilkinson, supra note 163, at 307-08.  
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does not mean relegation of judges to a trivial or 
mechanical role, but rather affords the most 
responsible room for creative, important judicial 
contributions.181 
I think that Gerald Gunther, when he spoke these words, was holding 
up the model of a good common law judge, and Ginsburg obviously 
agreed with him.  Imbued with the scrupulous and cautious spirit of 
his mentor, Judge Learned Hand, Gunther felt that a judge should act 
with restraint.  Despite his brilliant academic success at Harvard, 
Hand was full of insecurity and self-doubt all his life.182  When 
writing opinions, he would often agonize over the merits, and he 
sometimes would go through numerous drafts of an opinion before it 
became final.   
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist described the judiciary 
as “the least dangerous branch” of government because it “had no 
influence over either the sword or the purse . . . It may truly be said to 
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”183  As we 
have seen, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton are open to the charge that 
the Supreme Court was in effect legislating when it issued the 
decisions.184  Ginsburg appreciated how the law involved a dialogue 
between courts, legislative bodies and the general public, and she 
noted that courts generally follow, rather than leading, changes taking 
place elsewhere in society.185  For this reason, she appreciated the 
 
181 Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1209; supra note 126 
182 He was keenly disappointed that he was not selected by any of the Harvard 
social clubs, and he was unsuccessful in the Glee Club and football team.  He later 
acknowledged: “I was never any good as a lawyer.  I didn’t have any success, any 
at all.”  GUNTHER, supra note 127, at 107.  When he accepted the Progressive 
nomination for Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, in 
1913, he refused to campaign since he could not bear “harassing the electorate.”  
He received only 13% of the vote and later decided that it was a mistake to have 
run: “I ought to have lain off, as I now view it; I was a judge and a judge has no 
business to mess into such things.” Id. at 237. 
183 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
184 Experience has shown, I believe, that Hamilton might have under-estimated the 
power and dangerous potential of the judiciary.  In any event, jurisprudential 
commentary is replete with warnings that the Supreme Court should not act as a 
“superlegislature”; as Ginsburg said, we do not have a “tricameral” national federal 
government. 
185 See Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1208, 1204-05. 
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value of an incremental, interstitial approach to judicial progress,186 
and this has always been how the common law evolved. 
The common law system was the basic original framework of 
Anglo-American law.  For centuries during the Middle Ages, the 
common law developed incrementally, when the king’s judges 
traveled around the realm and had to adjudicate disputes between the 
king’s subjects.  The most common civil forms of action were torts 
and contracts.  Over the years, the courts built up a body of judge-
made law which honored precedent.  When an instant case raised 
essentially the same question of law as one from the year before, 
stare decisis dictated that the judge should follow precedent rather 
than reaching a new and different conclusion in the new case.  If a 
case could be narrowly decided, based on a limited legal issue, then 
the judge was supposed to decide it thus and avoid stating a broad 
principle that might lead to results in a future case that the judge did 
not intend.  The courts were to proceed incrementally, by baby steps, 
since if a court made a mistake, it would require a smaller repair job 
to fix it.   
While it is customary to distinguish common law from 
constitutional law, they actually have much in common.  Their major 
difference is that constitutional law is anchored in a permanent legal 
text, which can only be altered through the arduous and demanding 
process of amendment; in contrast, statutes can be altered or repealed 
by a mere majority vote.  Yet the brevity and generality of 
constitutional provisions necessitates that courts explain, elaborate 
and expand on their meaning. In doing so they are continuing to 
create a body of constitutional common law.187 
With respect to Roe v. Wade, Ginsburg was concerned about 
“the fragile textual backing for privacy upon which Roe rested, 
deriving as it did from what many legal scholars had regarded as 
sloppy jurisprudence in the earlier Griswold decision.”188 She firmly 
believed that basing a woman’s right to an abortion on the equal 
protection clause would make it less vulnerable to legal challenge.  
She imagined that if the Court had merely struck down the extreme 
Texas prohibition of abortion without more, that could have opened a 
dialogue between state legislatures, their citizens and the courts, and 
 
186 See id. at 1209 (regarding Gunther’s remarks at her D.C. Circuit installation). 
187 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). 
188 DE HART, supra note 1, at 192. 
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“[l]aws that proved too restrictive could then have been challenged so 
that the Court might proceed incrementally, giving the public more 
time to adjust.”189  She feared that the “backlash” that greeted Roe 
might intensify and threaten “the institutional legitimacy and 
authority” of the Supreme Court itself.190 
The Supreme Court majority of seven to two in Roe v. Wade 
may have believed that it was timely and appropriate to issue a 
uniform national rule on abortion in what Justice Ginsburg called 
“that breathtaking 1973 decision.191  They may have thought that they 
were achieving judicial economy by thus speeding up the process to 
conclusion.  However, in 1993, Justice Ginsburg questioned whether 
this result was “worth it,” since “a well-organized and vocal right-to-
life movement rallied and succeeded, for a considerable time, in 
turning the legislative tide in the opposite direction.”192  Ginsburg 
further stated that “Roe . . . halted a political process that was moving 
in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness 
and deferred stable settlement of the issue.”193    
“BURKEAN MINIMALISM” AND “THE GOOD JUDGE” 
I believe that a legal philosophy which has been called 
“Burkean minimalism” accurately describes the judicial philosophy 
that Ginsburg received from Gerald Gunther’s description of how a 
“good judge” decides cases.194  Professor Cass Sunstein has 
elaborated this jurisprudential approach in his writing.  The label of 
course refers to Edmund Burke,195 the great Irish statesman and 
conservative political philosopher who published his famous work 
only a year after the French Revolution.196  Sunstein comments: 
“Burke opposes theories and abstractions, developed by individual 
 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 192-93.  
191 Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1198. 
192 Id. at 1205. 
193 Id. at 1208. 
194 Cass Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006) 
195 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Barnes & 
Noble 2010).  Burke was born in 1729 and died in 1797.  Camil Ungureanu, 
Introduction to EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, at 
vii-ix. 
196 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE 
EDMUND BURKE 416, 451 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). 
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minds, to traditions built up by many minds over long periods,”197 
including the common law.  Burke wrote in the following famous 
passage: 
We wished at the period of the Revolution, and we do 
now wish, to derive all we possess as an inheritance 
from our forefathers . . . The science of government 
being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for 
such practical purposes, a matter which requires 
experience, and even more experience that any person 
can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and 
observing he maybe, it is with infinite caution that any 
man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice 
which has answered in any tolerable degree, for ages 
the common purposes of society, or on  building it up 
again, without having models and patterns of approved 
utility before his eyes.198 
Sunstein’s calls his interpretation of the Constitution “Burkean 
minimalism” and defines it as follows: 
Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional 
principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, 
with close reference to long-standing practices.  Like 
all minimalists, Burkeans insist on incrementalism but 
they also emphasize the need for judges to pay careful 
heed to established traditions and to avoid independent 
moral and political arguments of any kind.199   
Sunstein cites Justices Felix Frankfurter and Sandra Day 
O’Connor as “the most prominent practitioners of Burkean 
minimalism, in the sense that they have tended to favor small steps 
and close attention to both experience and tradition.”200  He 
distinguishes Burkean minimalists, from “originalists” and 
”conservative perfectionists,”  but notes that “all three disapprove of 
those forms of liberal thought that culminated in the work of the 
Warren Court and on occasion its successors.”201  He further notes 
that “[a]ll three approaches are at least skeptical of Roe v. Wade” and 
 
197 Sunstein, supra note 194, at 369. 
198 EDMUND BURKE, THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 451 (1999). 
199 Sunstein, supra note 194, at 356. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 358. 
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“the effort to remove religion from the public sphere . . . .”202  
Burkeans value narrow, incompletely theorized rulings and thus 
reject both width and depth.”203 
One important feature of Burkean minimalism is 
“narrowness;” Burkean minimalists favor “narrow” rulings, “which 
do not venture far beyond the problem at hand, and attempt to focus 
on the particulars of the dispute before the Court.”204  “Wide” rulings 
are the opposite of “narrow” ones, and “[m]inimalists fear that wide 
rulings will produce errors that are at once serious and difficult to 
reverse – a particular problem when the stakes are high.”205  
 
Secondly, Burkean minimalists favor “rulings that are shallow 
rather than deep.  Shallow rulings attempt to produce rationales and 
outcomes on which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their 
disagreement on or uncertainty about the most fundamental 
issues.”206 
Sunstein suggests that “shallow” rulings may prevent errors 
and “promote social peace,” because the meanings of the same 
general terms may be interpreted differently by people who can 
nevertheless agree on the terms used.207 
As far as “tradition” is concerned, Burke thought that 
“reasonable citizens, aware of their own limitations, will effectively 
delegate authority to their own traditions,” which embody “the 
judgments of many people operating over time.”208  This has 
particular relevance to the common law:  
Burke sees his claims as a reason to value rather than 
to repudiate the common law, which he goes so far as 
to call the ‘pride of the human intellect.’  Burke 
contends that ‘with all its defects, redundancies, and 
errors,’ jurisprudence counts as ‘the collected reason 
of ages, combining the principles of original justice 
with the infinite variety of human concerns.209 
 
202 Id. at 358. 
203 Id. at 358. 
204 Id. at 362. 
205 Id. at 363. 
206 Id. at 364. 
207 Id. at 365. 
208 Id. at 371. 
209 Id. at 371-72. 
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A final problem that Sunstein addresses is “the Burkean 
dilemma.”  “Burkean minimalists respect the demands of stare 
decisis, believing as they do that entrenched decisions may well 
embody wisdom and that new departures are likely to have 
unanticipated consequences, especially if existing law is embodied in 
social practices as well as judicial doctrines.”210  But if Burkean 
minimalists disagreed on the premises of the original decision, then 
how should they deal with it when it has been entrenched for years?  
This “dilemma” has no easy answer.  One option is to narrow 
considerably the entrenched decision without overruling it, and 
moreover,  
 
[i]t is easy to see how Burkeans might be drawn to this 
way of dealing with Roe v. Wade.  But it would not be 
out of bounds for Burkeans to conclude that the most 
indefensible departures from their preferred method 
must be sharply cabined or even overruled, at least if it 
is possible to do so without disrupting reasonable 
expectations or undoing a great deal of the fabric of 
existing law. Committed Burkeans might well take 
this approach to Roe . . .211  
“No Burkean is likely to believe that Roe was correct in the 
first instance,”212 but some might conclude that it has become so 
embedded in social practices that overruling it might create “a kind of 
social upheaval.”213  Thus, “reasonable Burkeans” could disagree 
about whether to overrule Roe v. Wade. 
Sunstein summarizes his article as follows: 
Burkeans value narrow, incompletely theorized rulings 
and thus reject both width and depth. What Burkeans 
add is an emphasis on the need to develop law with 
close reference to established practices and traditions 
and a corresponding distrust of judicial judgments that 
are not firmly rooted in long-standing experience…214 
 
210 Id. at 402. 
211 Id. at 403. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 408. 
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Sunstein presented his minimalist judicial philosophy more 
fully in a 1999 book.215  At that time, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question of whether there was a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide.  A majority of five justices merely said that there is 
no general right to suicide, assisted or otherwise, but it left open the 
possibility that under special circumstances, people might have a 
right to assisted suicide after all.216  He commented: 
In other words, the Court left the most fundamental 
questions undecided.  Far from being odd or 
anomalous, this is the current Court’s usual approach.  
In this way, the Court is part of a long historical 
tradition.  Anglo-American courts often take small 
rather than large steps, bracketing the hardest and 
most divisive issues. 
My goal in this book is to identify and to defend a 
distinctive form of judicial decision-making, which I 
call “minimalism.”217 
He further explains: 
Procedure first: A minimalist court settles the case 
before it, but it leaves many things undecided.  It is 
alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a 
heterogeneous society.  It knows that there is much 
that it does not know; it is intensely aware of its own 
limitations.  It seeks to decide cases on narrow 
grounds.  It avoids clear rules and final resolutions.  
Alert to the problem of unanticipated consequences, it 
sees itself as part of a system of democratic 
deliberation; it attempts to promote the democratic 
ideals of participation, deliberation and responsiveness 
. . . To the extent that it can, it seeks to provide rulings 
that can attract support from people with diverse 
theoretical commitments.218 
Minimalism is not a form of judicial “activism.”  On the contrary, 
 
215 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
216 Id. at ix.  
217 Id. 
218 Id. at x. 
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Minimalists are protective of their own precedents and 
cautious about imposing their own views on the rest of 
society.  Certainly, they disfavor broad rules that 
would draw a wide range of democratically enacted 
legislation into question . . . They prefer to leave 
fundamental issues undecided.  This is their most 
distinctive characteristic . . .219 
Sunstein discusses Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade at 
length.  With regard to Roe, he states that “[p]erhaps the Roe 
outcome was correct as a matter of substantive constitutional theory . 
. . . But at least it seems reasonable to think that the democratic 
process would have done much better with the abortion issue if the 
Court had proceeded more cautiously and in a humble and more 
interactive way.”220 
Minimalists clearly have great respect for Alexander Bickel, 
the great Yale Law School professor who wrote The Least Dangerous 
Branch.221  Bickel championed “the passive virtues,” which are 
exercised when a court refuses to assume jurisdiction.222  This is not 
necessarily because the case is unimportant, but because it is 
untimely to do so.  This is inevitable in many cases where the 
Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari because its vast 
potential docket makes it impossible to grant much more than 1% of 
such petitions.  As Sunstein further observes, the passive virtues are 
also served by the principle of justiciability: “The basic principles of 
justiciability are designed to limit the occasions for judicial 
interference with political processes.” 
Sunstein further realizes that:  
[t]hose who favor passive virtues, narrow decisions, 
incompletely theorized agreements tend to be humble 
about their own capacities.  They are not by any 
means skeptics; but with respect to questions of both 
substance and method, they are not too sure that they 
 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 37. 
221 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS Branch (Yale Univ. Press, 2nd 
ed. 1986) (1962). 
222 SUNSTEIN, supra note 215, at 39. 
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are right.  They know that their own attempts at theory 
may fail . . .223 
A minimalist approach is also appropriate “where facts and values are 
in flux:” 
Minimalists refuse to freeze existing ideals and 
conceptions; in this way they retain a good deal of 
room for future deliberation and choice. This is 
especially important for judges who are not too sure 
that they are right.224 
 
Since there is a natural desire among most people for clarity 
and certainty, it might seem odd to impute merit to a system that 
valorizes “incompletely theorized rulings” that are both “narrow” and 
“shallow.”  However, there is scarcely too much agreement and 
harmony in our contemporary, hostilely partisan world.  Even if the 
terms of certain rulings mean slightly different things to different 
people, “shallowness” might make it easier for them to agree with 
one another.  I think that Cass Sunstein’s Burkean minimalism 
plainly shows its derivation from the philosophy and wisdom of 
Learned Hand through Gerald Gunther to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and 
if it is followed by the courts, it might herald an era of greater comity 
in our nation. 
VALEDICTORY: A LIFE WELL LIVED 
In looking back on the remarkable life and career of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one cannot fail to be impressed by her wisdom 
and accomplishments.  She was brilliant, diligent and remarkably 
well-disciplined.  Her appointment to the Supreme Court at the 
relatively old age of sixty was a merit appointment, as her ninety-six 
to three confirmation vote suggests.  It is a tribute to her sagacity, 
strategic skills and sense of timing that she was the litigator most 
responsible for making lasting changes in women’s legal rights 
during the 1970s.  Unlike other revolutionary changes in the law in 
 
223 Id. at 40. 
224 Id. at 259.  The evocation of Learned Hand’s May 1944 speech in Central Park 
and Gerald Gunther’s remarks at Ginsburg’s swearing in as a D.C. Circuit judge are 
unmistakable.  Incidentally, Sunstein identifies Ginsburg as a somewhat liberal 
minimalist.  Id. at 62. 
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the twentieth century, the changes in the law that she helped bring 
about have won universal acceptance.  I think that this is due in part 
to her commitment to interstitial development of the law, influenced 
by her knowledge of common law and its history.  She understood 
and appreciated historical processes and how law evolves through the 
interaction of legislatures, courts and the beliefs and culture of the 
American people.   
No stranger to tragedy, poverty, and setbacks, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg led a trailblazing life within a traditional framework.  As a 
young woman, she married the love of her life and had children.  She 
supported her husband when he fell ill in law school while she 
continued her own studies and took care of their daughter.  She was 
lively, beautiful, and well-liked.  The male legal community denied 
her jobs that went to males, so she became a teacher.  While she was 
a law professor, she became an active litigator in the 1970s and won 
landmark cases to further the civil rights of women.  Along the way, 
she was supported by men in her personal life who helped her to 
achieve her goals.  She remained true to her jurisprudential 
philosophy and took advantage of every opportunity to help bring 
about permanent improvements in women’s rights.  Her brilliance, 
her work ethic, and her strength of character eventually won for her a 
position of power, acclaim and influence.  She was a woman of her 
time who became a legend.  Tikkun olam.  May her memory be a 
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